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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human biological material is increasingly being used for research purposes. In 
combination with associated health-related data, research on human biological material allows 
researchers to investigate the effects of genetic predisposition, life-style and exposure to 
environmental factors. In this way, research on human biological material holds great promise 
for the development of diagnostic and therapeutic tools and disease-preventing strategies.  
Biological material may be procured not only from living persons but also from the 
dead. Biological material removed post mortem is a particularly valuable resource for research, 
especially because some tissues generally only become available after death (e.g. brains, hearts, 
and metastasized tumors). Considering the enormous efforts that are currently being made to 
study the biochemical processes and possible genetic causes that underlie cancer and 
cardiovascular and neurodegenerative diseases, it is likely that biological material removed post 
mortem will continue to gain in importance. 
The removal and storage of biological material from the deceased raises specific ethical 
concerns. As has recently been highlighted in various post mortem organ retention scandals in 
England, Wales, Scotland and Australia, severe ethical problems arise when proper consent is 
not sought (English and Sommerville 2003; Thomas 2002). In the wake of the outrage caused 
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by the scandals in the Bristol Royal Infirmary and Liverpool’s Alder Hey Hospital,1 the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 and Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 came into force in the UK. Subject to 
criminal sanctions, the post mortem removal of human biological material for research is now 
only allowed in the UK after so-called ‘appropriate consent’ is given. If the deceased person 
had not given explicit consent, that consent must be obtained from a ‘nominated representative’ 
or, in the absence of such, from a person who stood in a qualifying relationship with the 
deceased.2 
In countries operating an explicit consent or so-called ‘opt-in’ system for post mortem 
organ donation, similar provisions apply to post mortem removal of body material for research. 
Likewise, some countries operating a presumed consent or so-called ‘opt-out’ system for post 
mortem organ donation for transplantation have recently extended the presumed consent system 
to post mortem removal of human body material for research. This has happened in Spain, 
France and Belgium. It has resulted in a twofold extension of the presumed consent regime that 
governs cadaveric organ transplantation: first, an extension from post mortem removal of 
organs to post mortem removal of any human body material that falls under the scope of the 
applicable law on human body material, and secondly, an extension from post mortem removal 
for transplantation purposes to post mortem removal for research purposes. 
In Spain, this extension was introduced by the Royal Decree of 18 November 2011.3 
The Decree allows removal of body material after death for research purposes when the 
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deceased person had expressed consent or at least had not indicated opposition. In the latter 
case, efforts must be made to gather information about the wishes of the deceased person, by 
exploring the existence of advance directives or, in the absence of these, by consulting the next-
of-kin and health care professionals involved in the treatment of the person concerned. If there 
is no indication of the deceased person’s wishes, removal is allowed unless the next-of-kin 
provide reasonable objections. Removal is only permitted if it is performed within the 
framework of a research protocol that has been approved by a Research Ethics Committee.  
In France, a presumed consent system for post mortem removal of human body material 
for research was introduced by the Law N° 2004-800 on Bioethics of 6 August 2004.4 The Law 
amended the Health Act in a way that allows post mortem removal of body material for 
research if the person concerned had not indicated refusal. The opportunity is offered to register 
refusal in a special national registry. In the absence of registered refusal, the next-of-kin must 
be consulted about the wishes which the deceased might have expressed in this regard. If there 
is no indication of the deceased person’s wishes, the removal will be permitted. The next-of-kin 
should be duly informed about the purpose of the removal and have the right to be informed 
about what body material has been removed. The Agency of Biomedicine has to grant prior 
approval of the research protocol and needs to be informed prior to any removal. 
Whereas specific protective measures are in place in both the Spanish and French 
regulations, this is not the case in Belgium. Concerning post mortem removal of human body 
material for research, the Belgian law on human body material of 19 December 20085 simply 
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4 
 
refers to the provisions regarding presumed consent in the Organ Transplantation Law of 13 
June 1986.6  
The Belgian law of 2008 equates the absence of any registered objection to post mortem 
removal of organs for transplantation with the absence of any objection to post mortem removal 
of any body material for any purpose. Thus, the law permits post mortem removal of body 
material from any corpse, unless the deceased person has objected to post mortem removal of 
organs for transplantation. No separate ‘opt-out’ register has been put in place for registering 
objections to post mortem uses of body material for research. However, the Belgian population 
is unaware of this law. Neither the government nor any other organization has made any effort 
whatsoever to inform the public of this new legal regime for the post mortem procurement of 
body material. As a result, any citizen who objects to post mortem removal of his or her body 
material for research will obviously fail to register this objection.  
Thus, in practice, the new Belgian presumed consent system amounts to a routine 
removal of body material after death whenever a clinician or researcher: (1) finds a specific 
post mortem removal useful for research; (2) has access to a dead body; and (3) neither the 
deceased nor the next-of-kin object(ed) to post mortem removal of organs for transplantation. 
In this paper, we attempt to determine which consent regime should govern the post 
mortem procurement of body material for research. We first analyze whether a regime of 
conscription or compulsory removal is ethically acceptable. We will assess the various 
arguments that could be put forward in support of  a duty to make body material available for 
research purposes after death. Our analysis suggests that a duty to make one’s body material 
available for research after death can be substantiated on at least two grounds (a duty to refrain 
from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the maintenance of public goods) and possibly also 
                                                          
6
  Wet betreffende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/Loi sur le prélèvement et la transplantation 
d’organes, Art. 10-13. Official versions of the law exist only in Dutch and French. 
5 
 
on a third ground (a duty of easy rescue, depending on how such a duty is interpreted), but that 
this duty is always conditional. We conclude that this duty could support conscription but only 
as a last resort and only if a way were found to guarantee that two conditions that attach to the 
duty would be met. Since neither of these two criteria is currently fulfilled, conscription must 
be rejected. We conclude, however, that the duty to make body material available for research 
purposes after death is sufficiently strong to defend a policy of presumed rather than explicit 
consent. 
 
2. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A DUTY TO MAKE BODY MATERIAL 
AVAILABLE FOR RESEARCH AFTER DEATH 
A duty to make body material available for research after death could be advocated on 
the basis of two more fundamental duties: a duty of fairness towards research participants for 
having benefited from the results of research and a duty of beneficence, on the assumption that 
this type of contribution to research will prevent harm and does not imply a significant 
sacrifice. In this section, we will examine these arguments and indicate to what extent, if at all, 
they could support a duty to make one’s body material available for research after death. 
2.1. Duty of Fairness 
It could be argued that people have a duty to make their body material available for 
research purposes after they die, out of fairness for having benefited from the results of 
biomedical research throughout their life. Following Rawls’ (1971) principles of justice, the 
duty of fairness implies that people who benefit from participating in cooperative social 
schemes have duties towards each other to assume, when called upon, the risks and burdens 
which accompany the involvement in such social schemes. On the basis of such a duty, several 
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prominent bioethicists have argued for a general duty to participate in biomedical research 
which, it is implied, could also require persons to allow research to be performed on their 
remains (Caplan 1984; Harris 2005; Rhodes 2008). The duty of fairness can be split up into two 
more specific duties: a duty to refrain from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of public goods. In the following two subsections, we analyze each of these duties 
and argue that they both support a conditional duty to make body material available for 
research after death. 
 
2.1.1. Duty to refrain from free-riding  
Some bioethicists argue that people who do not take part in biomedical research, while 
at the same time accepting its benefits, are free-riding on the backs of those who do participate 
(Evans 2004; Harris 2005; Orentlicher 2005; Rhodes 2005). As we all (at least in industrialized 
countries) gain from the results of biomedical research, they argue, non-participants have an 
outstanding moral debt which implies a duty to also participate in biomedical research.  
Free-riding occurs when a person obtains a benefit resulting from the efforts of others 
and this person refuses to assume part of the burdens involved in bringing about the benefit. It 
could be argued that, although a moral debt will result from gaining from biomedical research 
in general, this moral debt can be made up for in other ways than participation in biomedical 
research. From this perspective, it is overly simplistic to label as free-riders those who benefit 
from biomedical research without themselves having participated. After all, almost all people 
already pay – via taxes, insurance policies or out of their own pockets – for almost every 
medical benefit they enjoy (Brassington 2011; de Melo-Martin 2008). In addition, they often 
also indirectly support – through taxes – biomedical research projects. However, according to 
this line of reasoning, it may be asserted that the small minority of individuals who do not 
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financially support biomedical research can still be accused of free-riding and may fairly be 
expected to make up for their moral debt by participating in person. In response, it can be 
pointed out that the likely unfairness that leaves persons in a position of not being able to 
contribute financially may override obligations stemming from being free-riders.7  
By contrast, if the focus is shifted to the moral debt arising from benefiting from 
specific knowledge resulting from biomedical research on body material, the conclusion that 
non-participation amounts to free-riding is much harder to escape. After all, specific biomedical 
research cannot be carried out on the basis of financial contributions alone (Chan and Harris 
2009; Forsberg, Hansson, and Eriksson 2014). It could therefore be argued that a moral 
obligation exists to allow post mortem removal of one’s body material for research. However, 
this duty is conditional in that it will not attach to persons who have already donated samples 
while alive. Furthermore, it will only extend to types of research similar to the ones from which 
these persons had actually benefited.  
 
2.1.2. Duty to contribute to the maintenance of public goods 
A second argument put forward in support of a general duty to participate in biomedical 
research invokes the concept of ‘public goods’. A public good exhibits the characteristics of 
‘non-rivalry’ and ‘non-excludability’. Non-rivalry implies that a person can use the good 
without diminishing the amount available for others. Non-excludability refers to the 
impossibility of excluding anyone from enjoying the benefits of the good, even if they 
contributed nothing to its provision (Clark, Kotchen, and Moore 2003). Some claim that the 
knowledge resulting from biomedical research represents a public good. Given that we all 
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benefit from generalizable biomedical knowledge, it is argued, we have a duty to contribute to 
the advancement of such knowledge by participating in biomedical research (Schaefer, 
Emanuel, and Wertheimer 2009). Again, this implicitly could require persons to allow post 
mortem removal of their body material for research. 
The abovementioned argument has encountered major resistance.  A first criticism 
challenges the public good status attributed to biomedical knowledge on the grounds that 
disadvantaged groups have no (or limited) access to healthcare (de Melo-Martin 2008). It is 
rightly stressed that in the industrialized world, access to the results of biomedical research also 
depends on factors such as one’s financial situation (health insurance), the availability of 
preventative healthcare and the extent to which information concerning medical solutions and 
developments is conveyed. In response, however, it can be pointed out that this argument does 
not seem generally applicable to countries operating welfare states where, at least in principle, 
access to basic healthcare is also provided for otherwise disadvantages groups.8 Moreover, lack 
of access to healthcare does not preclude other ways of benefiting from biomedical knowledge. 
For example, people who do not have access to a vaccine will benefit from herd immunity as 
long as a substantial number of other persons are vaccinated. To mention another example, 
research conducted at the beginning of the last century demonstrated an inverse relationship 
between higher fluoride concentration of the drinking water and lower levels of dental caries 
experience (Ripa 1993). Based upon this finding, numerous countries have adjusted the water 
fluoride concentration to a level expected to promote dental health. Up until today, both the 
rich and the poor in those countries benefit from this practice. 
A second line of criticism argues that many biomedical research projects do not result in 
a public good. In this regard, three types of arguments are put forward. First, it is stressed that 
many research projects do not yield any relevant results and thereby fail to produce a public 
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good (Holm, Hofmann, and Solbakk 2009). Second, it is pointed out that a lot of research is 
carried out in a way that hampers other researchers from obtaining useful results in the same 
field and, thereby, hinders the development of public goods. Typical measures include the 
refusal to publicly report findings and the use of patenting and licensing practices, which may 
stall subsequent research and the development of diagnostic and therapeutic tools (Sterckx 
2011; Cockbain and Sterckx 2011). Third, it is observed that biomedical research projects may 
also be harmful to the participants. Even in the absence of physical harm, there is a possibility 
of researchers exploiting research participants by viewing them merely as a means to achieving 
prestige and/or wealth, as in the cases of, for example, the late John Moore (see Moore v. 
Regents of University of California 1990) and the members of the Havasupai tribe in the 
United States (Van Assche, Gutwirth, and Sterckx 2013). Furthermore, research results may, 
for example in the case of genetic research, also be used for insurance or employment 
discrimination or be stigmatizing for the research participant or the wider group (Ashburn, 
Wilson, and Eisenstein 2000; Van Assche and Sterckx 2014). However, these arguments miss 
the point since they do not refute the public good status of biomedical knowledge but merely 
emphasize that research should be carried out in a proper way. 
A final group of critics acknowledges the public good status of biomedical knowledge, 
but disputes the claim that research participation is required in order to discharge the duty to 
contribute to the maintenance of the public good. However, as we have argued in the context of 
free-riding, biomedical research cannot be carried out on the basis of financial contributions 
alone. It could therefore be argued that, to the extent that biomedical knowledge can only be 
attained by direct participation of individuals, the duty to maintain the public good will result in 
a duty to participate. 
On this basis, a duty may be said to exist to contribute to the maintenance of biomedical 
knowledge by post mortem donation of body material for research purposes. However, it 
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should be stressed that this duty is conditional. Following the general principle of fairness, 
persons who have donated body material whilst alive will already have done their fair share. 
Moreover, the duty will only extend to research projects which focus on obtaining biomedical 
knowledge that would unquestionably qualify as a public good. 
2.2. Duty of Beneficence 
An additional argument that could be invoked to substantiate a duty to make one’s body 
material available for research purposes after death does not focus on the duty of fairness but 
on the duty of beneficence. The latter implies that we have to act in ways that prevent or 
remove harm or that confer benefit (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). According to some 
commentators, given that biomedical research represents a necessary tool for alleviating the 
plight of patients, we have a moral duty to participate in biomedical research (see, for example, 
Harris 2005). If such a duty were to be established, this could require people to allow post 
mortem removal of their body material for research. In this respect, a distinction needs to be 
made between the general duty of beneficence and the more specific duty of easy rescue. In the 
following subsections both duties will be analyzed and it will be argued that the duty of easy 
rescue can only support a conditional duty to make body material available for research after 
death. 
2.2.1. General duty of beneficence 
While the duty of non-maleficence (i.e. the duty to refrain from causing harm) can be 
considered as a perfect duty, the general duty of beneficence is merely an imperfect duty 
(Shapshay and Pimple 2007). The assumption of a perfect moral duty to help others is 
untenable, for at least two reasons. First, such a duty would require too great an effort because 
it would command people to continuously engage in a wide range of actions of benefit to 
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society (Murphy 2000). Second, a perfect moral duty of beneficence would also undermine our 
moral integrity. Given that there are many ways in which harm to others can be limited, we 
would be obliged to spend most of our time, energy and resources on combating poverty, 
hunger, and wars, rather than on projects which minimize harm to others to a lesser extent. As 
Williams has convincingly argued, a perfect moral duty of beneficence would reduce an 
individual to a ‘harm-minimizing instrument’ lacking any integrity. After all, his/her actions 
would not correspond to his/her convictions and life projects (Williams 1990). 
An imperfect duty to help others implies that we ought to view the happiness of others 
as an end in itself. However, at the same time we are given great leeway in achieving this goal. 
We are allowed to weigh up this end against other (possibly private) ends. Thus, the pursuit of 
others’ happiness need not always be prioritized (Hill 1992). If we acknowledge the existence 
of an imperfect moral duty to help others, the question arises as to why this duty would entail 
obligatory participation in biomedical research, including making our body material available 
for research after death (Shapshay and Pimple 2007; Wachbroit and Wasserman 2005).  
The duty of beneficence requires us to support our fellow-man. There are various ways 
of achieving this end, however, many of which are much more effective than participation in 
biomedical research (de Melo-Martin 2008). Even if the fight against disease were our primary 
task, it is not clear why participation in research is the only or even the best way of achieving 
this. Biomedical research (especially in its current form) may not represent the best means of 
reducing the global burden of disease. Given the close link between poverty and disease, 
fighting poverty would probably constitute a much more efficient means of combating disease 
(Woolf et al. 2007; Pogge 2002). 
In sum, if we consider the question at issue here from the perspective of a general duty 
of beneficence, the conclusion seems to be that, whereas people may have very good reasons to 
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make their body material available for research after death, they are not required to do so. It is 
up to them to decide whether and, if so, under what conditions, they want to fulfill their duty of 
beneficence by engaging in precisely this type of act. 
2.2.1. Duty of easy rescue 
However, under certain specific circumstances the duty of beneficence may be a perfect 
duty, in which case the discretion normally allowed by beneficence is eliminated. This is 
frequently referred to as the ‘duty of easy rescue’. The duty of easy rescue was first elaborated 
by Thomas Aquinas and has been introduced in bioethics by ethicists like Peter Singer and 
Michael Slote. In a relatively old, but still very influential article concerning famine and ethics, 
Peter Singer (1972) argued, on the basis of his famous thought experiment about a child 
drowning in a pond, that we are morally obliged to prevent harm whenever we are able to do so 
without having to sacrifice anything of comparable moral significance. Similarly, Michael 
Slote (1977) endorses the view that we have a duty to prevent serious harm whenever we are 
able to do so without interfering with our own life plan and without incurring serious harm. 
According to Beauchamp and Childress (2013, 206-9), there is an obligation to rescue if five 
cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (1) someone is at risk of significant loss of or damage to 
life, health or another basic interest; (2) another person’s action is required in order to prevent 
this loss or damage; (3) this action will probably prevent the loss or damage; (4) this action 
involves no important risks, costs or burdens for the other person; and (5) the expected gain for 
the person in need outweighs any likely harms, costs or burdens for the other person.  
 The duty of easy rescue is frequently used to justify an obligation of post mortem organ 
donation for transplantation, even to the point of advocating a system of conscription (Fabre 
2006; Hester 2006; Snyder 2009; Spital and Taylor 2007). However, even if an obligation to 
donate one’s organs for transplantation after death could be established on the basis of a duty of 
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easy rescue, a similar obligation to make one’s body material available for research purposes 
after death seems harder to substantiate. 
In the case at hand the first two conditions seem to be met since many individuals at 
significant (future) health risk will arguably substantially benefit from other person’s post 
mortem donation of body material for research. With regard to the third condition, discussion 
may arise as to how likely it needs to be that the post mortem donation of body material by a 
third person will prevent the health loss of the other person. In addition, uncertainty may exist 
as to how obvious the causal link between the contribution and the health benefit has to be. On 
the one hand, it can be argued that, even if a high probability of success and a clear causal 
relationship can be difficult to demonstrate, a duty of easy rescue may be defended if one 
factors in that this kind of health relief can only be achieved by collective and sustained action. 
On the other hand, the stock examples of easy rescue presented in the literature (e.g. assistance 
from bystanders which does not put them in harm’s way; post mortem organ donation) seem to 
suggest that, at the time of the required action, both the rescuer and the person in peril have to 
be clearly identified and that the action of one and only one person is required to help the 
person in need (James 2007; Smith 1990). In view of these considerations regarding the third 
condition of easy rescue, it seems clear the applicability of a duty of easy rescue can neither be 
easily substantiated nor simply discarded for the topic at issue here, i.e. making body material 
available after death for research purposes.  
Taking into account the fourth condition, a duty of rescue will only apply where the 
action that is required does not represent significant risks, costs or burdens to the person 
concerned (otherwise the rescue would not be ‘easy’). However, although this is frequently 
assumed, it is not at all obvious that the type of biomedical research at issue here – research on 
human body material – cannot involve important harms and wrongs. Some people may 
conscientiously object to the removal itself because of beliefs that the body should be buried as 
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a whole. For these persons the costs incurred may be substantial and even disproportionate 
when compared to the expected benefits of their contribution.  
Even for people who do not find the removal in itself objectionable, a lot could be at 
stake. As has already been highlighted, research on human body material may involve severe 
infringements upon the privacy, autonomy, or moral integrity of the research participants. 
Indeed, body material may be used in a way that is incompatible with the moral values of the 
person concerned. In this context it should be noted that, following Ronald Dworkin’s (1993) 
terminology, so-called ‘critical interests’ may be at stake.9 Such interests are bound in the 
projects, plans and choices that persons have made and that give meaning to their life. When 
meaningful life plans are made, it is important for the individual that others respect them and 
do not take actions that will critically impact on them in a negative way. From this perspective, 
people are entitled to their body material being used in a manner that corresponds to their life 
story, character, and values.10 Failure to respect this would amount to instrumentalization.11 As 
bioethicist Julian Savulescu has put it: 
Each mature person should be the author of his or her own life. Each person has values, 
plans, aspirations, and feelings about how that life should go. People have values which 
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 ‘Critical interests’ need to be distinguished from so-called ‘experiential interests’ which are related to the 
pursuit of pleasurable experiences. Contrary to ‘critical interests’, the setback of experiential interests will be 
temporarily frustrating at most (Dworkin 1993). 
10 
 As the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission already observed in 1999, anonymization of the body 
material cannot invalidate this claim: “It is incorrect to assume that because the sources cannot be identified 
they cannot be harmed or wronged. […] Individuals have an interest in avoiding uses of their tissues they 
regard as morally impermissible or objectionable. Thus, were their materials to be used in research that they 
would consider objectionable, it is possible that some individuals could be wronged, if not harmed” (NBAC 
1999, 61). At most, anonymization might offer protection with regard to privacy, although several recent 
studies suggest that even this cannot be guaranteed (McGuire and Gibbs 2006; Schmidt and Callier 2012; 
Lowrance and Collins 2007). 
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  We are not suggesting here that the instrumentalization argument holds generally, i.e. that it is never 
permissible to do something to a competent person that does not correspond to their life story, values and 
character. In exceptional cases coercion might be permissible (e.g. mandatory immunization; coerced 
placement and treatment) but these interventions find their justification in averting a grave and direct danger to 
the person concerned, third parties or society at large. These conditions do not apply to (post mortem) removal 
of body material for research. 
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may collide with research goals [...]. To ask a person’s permission to do something to that 
person is to involve her actively and to give her the opportunity to make the project a part 
of her plans. When we involve people in our projects without their consent we use them 
as a means to our own ends. (Savulescu 2002, 648-49) 
 
In the literature, it is sometimes quickly assumed that dead individuals cannot be 
harmed by posthumous events. Proponents of this view argue that, as the deceased have no 
interests, there are no interests which can be harmed by the posthumous use of their body 
material (Spital and Erin 2002). By contrast, defenders of the concept of ‘posthumous interests’ 
argue that people do have critical interests that survive their death and may thus be harmed 
when these interests are violated (see, for example, Belliotti 2012).  
Although this debate is highly fascinating, we cannot elaborate on it here and we shall 
suffice to say that we agree with those commentators who claim that we should respect the 
wishes of people also after their death, yet not out of a concern for harming them through 
posthumous events but for the sake of the living (Hamer and Rivlin 2003; Partridge 1981; 
Wicclair 2002). Generally, one can draw great reassurance and comfort, while alive, from the 
knowledge that one’s preferences and values will be respected after death. Conversely, the 
expectation that one’s preferences and values will be disregarded after death is likely to result 
in considerable anxiety and distress among the living (Wicclair 2002). As a result, the living 
have an interest in respecting the wishes of the deceased because in doing so they will 
strengthen the traditions that will protect their own interests in having posthumous influence 
(Partridge 1981). 
Therefore, we would conclude that, even if the first three requirements for easy rescue 
would be fulfilled, no obligation to make one’s body material available for research after death 
could be established on the basis of a duty of easy rescue when that research would disregard 
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important values and wishes of the deceased, or, put differently, samples should only be 
removed after death if such removal and subsequent research would be compatible with the 
critical interests of the pre mortem person. Hence a duty of easy rescue can only be a 
conditional duty in the context at issue here, and it cannot be sufficient to justify a conscription 
regime. This leads us to the question as to how people’s wishes with regard to research uses of 
their body material should be ascertained, or, put differently, what kind of consent regime 
should apply. 
3. CONSENT REGIMES REVISITED 
We have reviewed several arguments that could be put forward in support of a duty to 
participate in biomedical research that could extend to a duty to donate body material for 
research after death. We found that such a duty could be substantiated on the basis of a least 
two grounds (a duty to refrain from free-riding and a duty to contribute to the maintenance of 
public goods) and possibly a third ground (easy rescue, depending on how the conditions for an 
easy rescue are specified). However, since, as explained above, in each of these cases important 
conditions need to be fulfilled before the duty to donate body material for research after death 
would be triggered, this duty is always conditional.  What does this imply with regard to the 
question which regime should govern the post mortem procurement of body material for 
research? 
3.1. No Consent: Conscription 
Can a conditional duty to donate body material for research after death commit us to 
accept a policy of conscription? Analyzing paradigmatic cases of conscription (e.g. military 
conscription; jury service; compulsory vaccination), Holm et al. conclude that conscription is 
only justified if its purpose cannot be achieved on a voluntary basis (Holm, Hofmann, and 
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Solbakk 2009). However, in the context of post mortem removal of body material the claim 
that conscription is necessary is not plausible, for other, less coercive ways exist to achieve a 
sufficient supply of body material. Even with regard to research that relies heavily on body 
material which only becomes available after death, there does not seem to be a need to resort to 
compulsory removal before other strategies have been actively pursued.  
If insufficient body material would be collected by resorting only to non-compulsory 
ways of post mortem removal, a policy of conscription could be justified on the basis of a duty 
to donate body material for research after death. However, in that case, the system of 
conscription would still need to comply with the conditions that attach to the duty. It could, for 
instance, be argued that, on the basis of a duty to contribute to the maintenance of public goods, 
samples from persons who did not donate body material while alive, may be conscripted after 
death if access to these samples would be limited to research projects which focus on obtaining 
biomedical knowledge that would unquestionably qualify as a public good. It has been 
proposed that this could be the case for research that is entirely uncontroversial and is likely to 
result in benefits that would be made available to everybody and would contribute to leveling 
social differences (Christensen 2009). However, in our view, these and similar suggestions 
raise overly challenging and arguably insurmountable problems related to the implementation 
and monitoring of the system of conscription. It would, for instance, be unclear who in each 
instance would decide whether conscription to a specific research project would be justified 
and what characteristics this project would need to have in order to be compatible with the 
conditional duty to make one’s body material available for research after death.12 
                                                          
12
  In addition, it should be noted that insurmountable problems would also arise with regard to monitoring 
whether persons had already donated body material while alive, especially taking into account that, even 
unbeknownst to the donor, body material removed for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes may have been used 
for research. 
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We can conclude that, in the current state of affairs, since the claim of necessity is not 
fulfilled and major problems of implementation and monitoring would arise, a system of post 
mortem conscription of body material for research cannot be substantiated on the basis of a 
duty to donate body material for research after death. 
3.2.  Presumed Consent Rather Than Explicit Consent 
By contrast, we would argue that the duty to donate body material for research after 
death is clearly strong enough to defend a system of presumed consent to post mortem removal 
of body material for research, rather than a regime of explicit consent which is the default 
option for participation in biomedical research. As we have seen, there are two and possibly 
three grounds to expect that individuals make their body material available for research after 
death. 13 Yet, since the resulting duty will always be a conditional one, it is reasonable to leave 
it to the persons concerned to decide for themselves if they do not wish to donate and to expect 
them to take the necessary steps to opt out if they wish.  
Indeed, it has been pointed out that a presumed consent system does not in any way 
restrict a person’s right to self-determination, as long as the person was aware of the system 
and the implications of action or inaction, had a reasonable time period in which to object, and 
was offered adequate and accessible means of formally recording objections (Den Hartogh 
2008). Furthermore, for many people the cost of contributing more than strictly required by 
duty are low.14 It may, for instance, be assumed that a lot of individuals do not have deep 
seated objections to the removal of body material after death, even in the absence of guarantees 
                                                          
13
  Arguably, the duties identified may be similarly strong enough to defend a system of presumed consent for 
research use of (anonymised) residual biological materials. However, since in that kind of context additional 
elements might need to be considered, we will not expand upon this possibility here. 
14
  We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. 
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that the research will comply with the conditions governing their duty (e.g. that the research 
will indeed result in knowledge constituting a public good). 
However, in order to minimize the chance that body material would be removed after 
death from persons to whom no duty applied (e.g. because the intended research project is 
incompatible with their pre mortem values, implying that the fourth and fifth condition for the 
existence of a duty of easy rescue would not be met) and who did not want to go beyond the 
call of duty, several requirements would need to be fulfilled. First, awareness-raising 
campaigns should be launched to inform the public about the possibility of post mortem 
removal of body material for research purposes, the possible research uses and the consent 
regime in place. Second, procedures should be established to allow potential participants to 
register their unwillingness to make their body material available for research after death.15 
Third, in the absence of a registered refusal, the next-of-kin must be consulted regarding the 
deceased person’s wishes. Finally, it is conceivable that some people are unwilling to donate 
body material for certain types of research uses, while willing to do so for other research 
purposes. Therefore, besides the possibility for a blanket opt-out, it would seem to be advisable 
to also enable one to opt-out for certain generic categories of research uses.16  
Admittedly, a system of presumed consent would imply the possibility that some people 
may opt out of making their body material available for research after death without having 
discharged their moral duty even though the conditions for the applicability of the duty were 
                                                          
15
  In other words, post mortem donation of body material and donation of organs should be governed by separate 
registers.  
16
  Admittedly, it is impossible to compose an exhaustive list of such categories. Nevertheless, one could envisage 
a system wherein a limited number of categories are listed, followed by a text-box in which the person can 
write down any other research uses that she deems unacceptable.Further analysis is necessary to underpin more 
specific proposals in this regard; our focus here is on highlighting the reasons why, for the case of post mortem 
uses of body material for research, it is ethically permissible to depart from the default regime for participation 
in biomedical research, i.e. explicit consent, and to adopt a regime of presumed consent with proper 
safeguards. 
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met. However, as noted earlier, there is no reason to legally enforce this moral duty as long as a 
sufficient supply of body material can be obtained by non-compulsory methods. 
4. CONCLUSION 
 On the basis of a critical examination of various arguments invoked in the literature, we 
found that a duty to make one’s body material available for research after death could be 
established on the basis of the duty to refrain from free-riding, the duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of public goods and, depending on the interpretation, possibly also the duty of 
easy rescue, although the latter ground applies less straightforwardly to the case under 
discussion here.  
However, we also found that in each instance the duty to make one’s body material 
available for research after death is a conditional one, hence this moral duty is not sufficient to 
justify the general adoption of a regime of post mortem conscription of body material for 
research purposes (and a conditional adoption would face massive monitoring problems). 
Moreover, we argued that a conscription regime, whether generalized or not, cannot be 
supported because it is unacceptable to resort to compulsory removal before other strategies to 
promote donation have been actively pursued and have been found to result in an insufficient 
supply of body material for research. 
By contrast, we found that the duty to make body material available for research after 
death is strong enough to depart from explicit consent, i.e. the default option for participation in 
biomedical research, and to support a system of presumed consent. Finally, we made a number 
of suggestions to improve existing systems of presumed consent so as to minimize the 
likelihood that body material would be removed after death if this would go against the wishes 
of individuals regarding the use of body material after their death. 
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